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Corruption Lingers in the Shadows
of the Chinese Media
Liu Xiaobo
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
This article first appeared in the monthly Kaifang zazhi (Open), Hong Kong, January
2004, pp. 45-48.
Translated from the French original by Michael Black.
There will figure Patrica Batto's words, published as an insert in print version,
reproduced as a chronicle in the present edition. 
1 That  the  monopoly  of  political  power  is  held  by  one  party  in  China  has  led  to
widespread corruption. China’s media have not escaped its spread, as with so many
other areas of society where corruption has long has a hold and where it continues to
spread. Corruption in the media is not limited to the use of public authority to obtain
favours, etc; it proliferates in editorial advertising and entirely manufactured news, but
in  particular  through  the  deliberate  concealment  by  the  media  of  the  corruption
within. It  is only in the last two years that the theme of corruption in the media—
despite  its  being  public  knowledge—has  emerged  like  the  tip  of  an  iceberg  in  the
information  organs  of  the  state.  Among  many  examples,  there  is  the  case  of  Li
Yuanjiang, former member of the Permanent Party Committee in Canton, head of the
Propaganda  Department  and  director  of  the  daily  Guangzhou  ribao1;  the  bribes-to-
Xinhua journalists  scandal  for  concealment  of  the  facts  at  the  request  of  the  local
authorities2; as well as the case of Zhao An, star presenter on China Central Television
(CCTV)3.
The spread of editorial advertising
2 The  duty  of  the  media  is  to  gather  and  broadcast  trustworthy  information.  The
credibility  of  the  media  depends  on  their  objectivity,  impartiality  and  even-
handedness.  The  information  provided  must  be  real  and  accurate.  For  journalists,
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attending press conferences and writing articles are part of their basic duties. Apart
from the remuneration provided by their employers, journalists and the media should
under no circumstances receive and accept  payment from anyone who may be the
subject of interviews, reports or commentary. As soon as relations between a journalist
and his interlocutor go beyond the domain of journalism and become mercenary, the
objectivity, accuracy and impartiality of the information exchanged is clearly lost. The
media, responsible for providing information in the public interest, become, in such a
situation, tools in the service of private interests. For a society’s media to not provide
the public with accurate, truthful and objective information, is for the media to do a
disservice to that society, and a society thus served is a society blinded.
3 At present in mainland China, relationships between the media and journalists, and
their  interlocutors,  are  the  opposite  of  what  they  should  be.  In  a  situation  where
backstage deals have become a system, editorial advertising4, or “advertorial” as the
written copy has become known, has, with quasi official approval, invaded the media.
Apart  from  information  about  sensitive  political  subjects,  all  other  information,
without exception, can be subject to deals.
“Travel expenses”
4 There is a close connection between the development of editorial advertising and the
growth of corruption on a system-wide scale. At the beginning of the 1990s, the media
were still “bureaucratic units” (shiye danwei) financed by a dedicated authority. In these
units,  apart  from salaries  and bonuses,  reporting expenses  were extremely  limited.
When journalists travelled for professional reasons, their work unit did not reimburse
them  for  the  costs  of  either  travel  or  meals.  Consequently,  they  had  become
accustomed to asking for  these from the work units  which they were visiting.  The
latter, keen to be mentioned in the media, reimbursed journalists for their travel costs,
either doing so willingly or bowing to pressure. Thus stories were covered in exchange
for meals or travel expenses. Journalists, in exchange for the news disseminated, were
paid “meal expenses” and “travel expenses”. Gradually, both parties found it simpler to
pay a cash sum. As corruption was becoming widespread in society as a whole, editorial
advertising became the norm. All enterprises that organise press conferences, all work
units  that  produce communiqués,  pay these  “travel  expenses”.  In  the  world  of  the
media it is an open secret.
5 Some media professionals go so far as to say that mainland Chinese journalists work
like “nightclub hostesses”. If one desires the company of a young woman, she must be
paid; in the same way, if one wants a journalist to come, he or she must be paid. A
journalist’s rate is in proportion to their renown. Naturally, famous journalists,  like
celebrities,  are more expensive than ordinary journalists.  The rate also depends on
one’s  place  in  the  hierarchy:  a  journalist’s  “expenses”  are  therefore directly
proportional to his ranking in the medium that employs him. All administrations have
rules  for  paying the various  media  appropriately,  according to  their  importance.  A
journalist from the national media would of course be better paid than a journalist with
provincial media. 
6 A journalist will usually be paid a minimum 100 yuan to travel. Generally there are
levels of payment: 200, 300, 500 and 800 yuan; the amount depends on the importance
of the host enterprise. Then there are specially commissioned articles, which often cost
between one and several thousand yuan. The bosses of some private enterprises pay
even more, as in some state enterprises, on the sly. Paying several thousand yuan for an
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article of a thousand characters is commonplace. A person known to the author and
working in an insurance company once organised a press conference. He was at that
time starting out, and with his little experience gave each journalist only 50 yuan. The
result: not a single article appeared.
7 To make things even more convenient, journalists now do not even need to write the
articles.  The organisers of press conferences take care of that:  they provide several
“ready to print” versions of the texts. The journalists and the media choose the version
which best suits them for publication.
8 In the same way, journalists form little clubs the aim of which is to share certain perks
among all  their  members.  So,  if  a  well-paid  press  conference is  being held,  all  the
journalists in the club will be invited. Journalists always travel in the company of a few
colleagues  who are  friends.  For  attending an ordinary press  conference,  journalists
generally receive 500 to 800 yuan. For a press conference organised for a new product
launch, from 1,000 to 2,000 yuan.
The opulence of Chinese journalists arouses the envy of their Western colleagues
9 Company bosses anxious to make their products known are far from being the only
lovers of editorial advertising. Even more partial to it are administrations and officials
(especially those at the local level) wanting to create an event around their political
achievements.  If  the media sing the praises of  the countless  building sites  that  are
mushrooming all over the country, it is because the information monopoly has made
journalists one of the privileged castes in China. Everywhere, a favourable account
from  the journalists  is  hoped  for,  and  a  negative  account  feared.  Special
correspondents  are  particularly  dreaded.  To  avoid  the  risk  of  compromising  one’s
career,  journalists  must  be  treated  as  distinguished  guests.  The  poorer  and  more
underdeveloped a place is, the more its officials need to become known, the more they
need  to  pride  themselves  on  their  political  achievements,  and  of  course  the  more
journalists will be venerated. Their presumptuousness then knows no bounds.
10 Some foreign journalists posted to Peking comment on how journalists with the major
Chinese media are privileged; when covering a story they do not have to even write the
articles, they are put up in luxury hotels, are entertained by local officials all day long,
and  when  they  leave  are  given  money  or  other  “expenses”.  While  the  country’s
transition  to  a  market  economy  has  produced  a  new  nouveau  riche  on  whom
journalists  rely,  the  bureaucratic  system has  indisputably  linked  journalists  closely
with high officials. Journalists who have found favour with local high officials toss aside
even the most rudimentary professional ethics,  and lose all  sense of morality. They
turn into praise-singers and concealers of the poverty of political power.
11 Below is a brief survey of the fees charged in the media for a flattering account of a
political leader, according to inside sources in the profession.
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Editorial advertising fees charged by some national media (yuan)
* The Chinese media issue a large number of internal publications intended for cadres of a certain
rank. These publications have great influence. See, for example, Wang Heyuan, “A quoi servent les
publications internes de l’Agence Xinhua?” (What use are Xinhua’s internal publications?), Perspectives
chinoises, No 5/6, July-August 1992, pp. 10-16. Source: Figures compiled by the author.
12 At present, journalists in mainland China are very rich. Private, and expensive, cars
abound in the CCTV housing area. Many Chinese journalists also have private villas
outside the city or have acquired agricultural land on which to build country houses.
Such a lifestyle cannot be explained by “travel expenses” alone, but by their activities
as courtiers to the rich. Thanks to the resources linked to their jobs they can organise
press  conferences,  find  advertising,  set  up  programmes,  arrange  appearances  on
broadcasts, or obtain official authorisations. Thus, during any conference on economics
at a national or international level in China, for example, the bosses of large private
companies and high-ranking CEOs are always flanked not only by their bodyguards but
by journalists.  The latter  are  not  on assignment to  cover the event,  but  are public
relations officers for the bosses, who they network for among officials and celebrities.
Remuneration for these “counselling” and “consultant” activities is substantial. Those
in television are even better off: they either set up their own companies, or settle for
being counted among the wealthy.
The roots of the systematic corruption of the media
13 According  to  some people,  editorial  advertising  is  the  result  of  the  transition  to  a
market economy, and the triumph of the laws of supply and demand. Purchasers of
editorial advertising are said to need mediatisation in the political and economic fields,
which is to say disguised advertising. Now, in China, of all the forms of corruption, the
biggest  is  political  corruption;  among the  many with  no  sense  of  shame,  the  most
brazen are the politicians—corruption and impudence are a system in themselves. In
actual  fact,  the  real  root  of  the  evil—beyond  the  transition  to  a  market  economy
brought about by the reforms—lies in the media system of the Communist Party.
• The Party’s spokesmen are inevitably corrupt. Under the Party’s monopoly, it is the Party which
finances the media, and bestows jobs and salaries. Consequently media employees provide
society with information which conforms to the requirements of the Party. This system does
not encourage the independence of journalists or real information; on the contrary, it
demands accounts which conform to the directives and tolerates false reports. Entirely
fabricated news and the corruption of the media were not born of the reforms; as if the
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“records” on which the Maoist era prided itself did not stem from corrupt information!
Chinese journalists, employees of the Party, have become used to this role as spokesmen. If
they are willing to falsify information in order to provide themselves with a job and a social
position, it is in the order of things that they will use the same means to make a quick
fortune.
• The monopoly of power breeds corruption. In China, all political power, including control of the
media, is the monopoly of the Party. All monopoly situations beget privileges, and privileges
obviously favour corruption. Under the aegis of the Party, there are no independent media.
As a consequence, neither is there any independent group of people responsible for the
management of the media. There are only the officials of the Party, responsible for
managing the information offices and the major media. The director of China Central
Television, just like the directors of the state banks, or the leaders of the provinces and the
ministers, is appointed by the Party. Consequently the corruption in the media is no
different from that rampant elsewhere: it consists of using public authority for personal
profit. The marketing of political power and the private use of public functions have opened
up vast prospects for corruption to the privileged caste constituted by the media
professionals.
• Professional ethics are trampled on, and so are the morals of society as a whole. The moral
degeneration of Chinese society obviously affects those who work in the media. Achieving
one’s ends, without any concern for the means employed, is one of the main explanations
for entirely fabricated news stories. Because the media possess the specific power to collect
and broadcast information, they have a tremendous capacity to direct and influence public
opinion. Consequently the greatest damage caused by corruption in the media is the
following: the journalists do not abase only themselves, they are also largely responsible for
the extinction of honesty and trust within society. The popular saying “Protect yourself
from fire, theft and journalists” is apt evidence of the seriousness of corruption in the
media.
• There is no mechanism for controlling the media. The media constitute the fourth power, their
primary function is to establish the public opinion’s control over other powers. But if the
media have a watching function, they also should be subject to the control of society. The
power of the media must be within the law and in working for the public good; it is essential
that their power be subject to regular control by the system and the public. This is an
imperative if a society is to work properly. But in China, who could control the media? It
would mean keeping an eye on the top leadership. The situation is already virtually
unmanageable. The organs of the CCP responsible for ideology produce text after text with
which to fight corruption in the media. For example, as early as 1991, the National
Association of Media Workers promulgated “Ethical standards for employees in the Chinese
media”. Subsequently, at regular intervals of a year or two, all the Party organs responsible
for ideology and their associations draw up related standards (zhunze) or regulations (tiaoli).
14 However  the  constraints  imposed  by  these  standards  and  regulations  remain
mechanisms which are internal to the sector. Their application depends mainly on an
improvement in the ethics of media professionals,  who might practise self-restraint
and  self-discipline.  These  control  mechanisms  are  devoid  of  any  transparency.
Consequently, of all sectors, it is in the media that corruption is least visible. Moreover,
the number of cases that come to light are minimised.
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No independent media under the watchful eye of the Party
© Imaginechina
The greed at Central Television is common knowledge
15 Let us look at the Zhao An case as an example. This case caused a national stir. The
court reported bribes amounting to 610,000 yuan, and sentenced Zhao to ten years in
prison. However, those who followed the scandal closely were all disappointed by the
verdict, the general impression being that the affair had been played down.
16 First of all, when Zhao An was arrested, the media carried numerous stories of the tens
of millions of yuan in cash which had been found during searches at his home. But this
turned out to be only 610,000 yuan. The considerable discrepancy between the two
figures is puzzling. Secondly, everyone knows that in order to be on any important
programme on Central Television, you have to be able to afford it. Zhao An was both
director of Central Television’s Department of Arts and Letters and producer and star
presenter of the top variety shows. In fact, he held the double power of media official
and TV star. Is the claim that he received bribes only from Zhang Junyi believable5?
Thirdly,  everyone  knows  that  television  is  the  most  influential  of  the  media.
Consequently it is the biggest nest of corruption in the Chinese media. The stars of
variety shows, enterprise bosses, local officials, any person or enterprise who wants to
appear on a television programme must begin by paying more than 10,000 yuan at the
very least. It is not in the least surprising that the Zhao An case came to light. The
greed  among  employees  of  Central  Television’s  Department  of  Arts  and  Letters  is
common knowledge in the world of television. The producers of the big variety shows
make fortunes by selling “admission tickets”.  Another source of enormous personal
profits  at  Central  Television is  the broadcasting of  series  at  peak viewing times.  In
general, in order for a series which has not been produced by Central Television itself
to be broadcast on prime time, considerable sums have to be paid.
17 The media are described as the “fourth power” or the “conscience of society”. They are
responsible for controlling political power. But in China, the fourth power is rotten, the
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conscience of society has been devoured by the lure of power and money. The media do
not  control  political  power,  they  are  a  party  to  it,  and  their  employees  form  a
privileged caste. It is thus no surprise at all that public office holders, the rich, and the
media together agree to deceive the public. At the same time, the world of the media
makes sure it looks after its own interests, by taking full advantage of the opportunities
offered by  its  activities  and the  monopoly  system that  prevails.  It  does  everything
possible to conceal the corruption at its heart and to sing its own praises. Thus, the
credits  of  Central  Television’s  news station provide a  typical  image of  grandeur,  of
glory  and  of  justice,  and  programmes  such  as  “Investigations  and  crucial debates”
(Jiaodian fangtan), “News Investigations” (Xinwen diaocha), or “Ethical Viewpoint” (Daode
guancha) claim as their main objective the uncovering of the dark sides of society; but
not yet has there been a programme on the shadowy areas of the world of the media. In
other words, in the Chinese media, the most serious manifestation of corruption lies
not so much in the existence of editorial advertising, as in the fact that its existence
cannot be headline news. 
NOTES
1. Li Yuanjiang, editor-in-chief and director of the Guangzhou ribao (Canton Daily), was
accused of having received under the table payments totalling 1.01 million yuan,
notably in the purchase of printing equipment. See “Corruption trial charges contested
by editor”, South China Morning Post, February 13th 2004, p. A5. In 2003, the Guangzhou
ribao claimed a circulation of 1.6 million copies; the press group to which it belongs has
the highest advertising revenues in the country: 1.3 billion yuan in 2003. [Editor’s note]
2. The scandal involved eleven journalists, four of whom worked for the Xinhua press
agency and the other seven for local newspapers. They had agreed to downplay an
accident in a goldmine in Shanxi province, in exchange for 74,640 yuan from the mine’s
owners, in collusion with the local authorities. Only two deaths had been reported, as
more than ten deaths would require the opening of a detailed enquiry. Following
complaints from villagers, a further 38 bodies were discovered. See “Cover-up of mine
disaster shakes Xinhua”, South China Morning Post, September 28th 2003, p. 6. [Editor’s
note]
3. Zhao An led the Chinese New Year eve variety programme broadcast by Central
Television, which has one of the largest audiences of the year. Accused of having
received 600,000 yuan from the artist Zhang Junyi, he was sentenced on December 12th
2003 to ten years in prison. Zhang Junyi was sentenced to six years in prison. See 
Kaifang zazhi (Open), January 2004, pp. 53-59. [Editor’s note]
4. Editorial advertising in the Chinese press consists of articles which appear to be
normal, but which in reality promote a product or a person, and the publication of
which is paid for by the promoters. Editorial advertising affects all the media, including
television. [Editor’s note]
5. See note 3.
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